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NOTE
FROM BEHIND THE CORPORATE VEIL: THE
OUTING OF WALL STREET'S INVESTMENT
BANKING SCANDALS - WHY RECENT
REGULATIONS MAY NOT MEAN THE DAWN OF
A NEW DAY
Gina N. Scianni*
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the
age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch
of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of
Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope,
it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we
had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we
were all going direct the other way.1
INTRODUCTION
It was the dawn of a new millennium, and the infamous
Internet tech bubble was about to burst. For years on Wall Street
you could practically recommend anything "beginning with 'e-'
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1. CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CITIES 1 (unabridged ed., Dover Thrift
1999) (1859).
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and see it trade at astronomical prices."2 However, behind the
scenes, Wall Street was harboring a dirty little secret. Some of its
highest paid investment bankers were handing out hot IP03
shares in return for kickbacks. Others were offering favorable
stock recommendations from their research analysts in order to
secure lucrative investment banking contracts. In effect, Wall
Street was catering to "two key constituencies: its institutional
investors and its corporate clients. If the individual investor
wanted to join the party, well, caveat emptor."4
With the advent of the Internet, along with the proliferation
of business news rags, and financial TV programs, Wall Street has
seen an increase in investor participation in the stock market.5
Unfortunately, quantity of information is no guarantee of quality,
and the armchair investor is an easy prey. "Recent investigations
into conflicts of interest on Wall Street have shown that in too
many cases in the past, investors' interests were compromised for
greater investment banking revenues."6 In response, State and
Federal regulators have proposed a number of comprehensive
2. See Chinese Walls Need a Leak Test, NAT'L Bus. REV., Oct. 25, 2002, available
at http://www.sharechat.co.nz/features/nbr/article.php/46aeb302 (last
visited Sept. 19, 2003).
3. See JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE
AND INVESTMENT TERMS 260 (4th ed. 1995) (defining "IPO" as "a corporation's
first offering of stock to the public. IPOs are almost invariably an opportunity
for the existing investors and participating venture capitalists to make big
profits, since for the first time their shares will be given a market value
reflecting expectations for the company's future growth.").
4. Landon Thomas, Jr., Can Settlement Actually Level Playing Field for
Investors?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2002, at C1.
5. See NASD Guide to Understanding Securities Analyst
Recommendations, at http://www.nasdr.com/analystjbrochure.htm (last
visited Sept. 19, 2003) [hereinafter NASD Guide] (explaining that as a result of
expanded market participation "there is a din of data for investors to sift
through today.., and as a result it has never been harder for small investors to
assess which information they should rely upon in making decisions.").
6. NASD News Release, NASD Charges Frank Quattrone with Spinning,
Undermining Research Analyst Objectivity, Failure to Cooperate in Investigation,
Mar. 6, 2003, at http://www.nasdr.com/news/pr2003/release03010.html
(last visited Mar. 9, 2003) [hereinafter NASD News Release, Quattrone] (citing
Mary L. Shapiro, NASD's Vice Chairman and President of Regulatory Policy
and Oversight).
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reforms in an effort to restore investor confidence and integrity to
the capital markets. 7
Part I of this note discusses pertinent background
information; the role of the research analyst in the capital
markets, types of conflicts of interest and early examples of
regulation that in the end proved unsuccessful. Part II begins
with illustrations of recent high-profile corporate scandals
regarding research analysts' conflict of interest, and then moves
on to discuss the recent regulatory efforts to curtail such activity.
Part III analyzes some of the problems and inconsistencies
inherent in some of the new rules and ultimately concludes that a
number of them fall short of their intended goals and that the
road to restoring investor confidence and market integrity is a
long way off.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Role of the Research Analyst
Research analysts examine companies in light of "economic,
industry and business trend information."8 That research is used
by broker-dealers to assist their customers in making informed
investment decisions, 9 and as a marketing device to promote buy
and sell recommendations on publicly traded securities. 10 In
addition, these brokerage firms commonly have investment
7. See NASD Understanding Securities Analyst Recommendations, A
Message from the Chairman and CEO of the NASD, at
http://nasdr.com/analystbgmessage.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2003)
(discussing recent "steps to educate investors and improve industry practices in
the area of securities analyst recommendations" ... as a part of a larger trend
to maintain the highest standards of investor protection and market integrity).
8. NASD Guide, supra note 5.
9. See id.
10. See Jill I. Gross, Securities Analysts' Undisclosed Conflicts of Interest: Unfair
Dealing or Securities Fraud?, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 631, 635 (2002) (noting
that brokerage firms typically use the research to recommend and sell securities
to their customers).
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banking divisions, which underwrite securities." "An
underwriter acts as intermediary between the company publicly
offering securities and investors buying new stock." 12
Typically research analysts fall into three categories: "sell-
side," "buy-side," and independent13 Sell-side analysts work for
large financial firms with brokerage customers.' 4  Buy-side
analysts, however, typically work for "institutional money
managers such as mutual funds, hedge funds or investment
advisors." 5 Finally, some analysts are unaffiliated, selling their
independent research to financial institutions or private investors
on an ad hoc or subscription basis.16
B. Tpes of Conflicts
Following the burst of the Internet bubble, the SEC launched
extensive on-site examinations of several full service brokerage
firms focusing on buy recommendations made by supposedly
independent research analysts to the investing public for
technology stocks.17  Investigators wondered how so many
analysts could have been wrong.18 In scrutinizing analysts'
11. Id. (explaining that "the investment banks will use the research to serve
an important due diligence function for the underwriters.").
12. See NASD Guide, supra note 5.
13. See Gross, supra note 10, at 635.
14. See id.
15. NASD Guide, supra note 5.
16. See id.
17. See Laura S. Unger, Testimony Concerning Conflicts of Interest Faced by
Brokerage Firms and Their Research Analysts, Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored
Enterprises, Committee on Financial Services United States House of
Representatives, at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/073101tslu.htn (last visited July 31,
2001) [hereinafter Unger Testimony]; see also Gross, supra note 10, at 632
(explaining that securities industry participants and observers focused on buy
recommendations made by analysts who appeared to have been independent
once the tech bubble burst and Internet stocks began to plummet).
18. See Gross, supra note 10, at 632 (stating that questions were raised as to
how so many of the analysts could have been wrong in recommending tech
stocks that were soon to crash).
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methods and motivations, the SEC discovered a number of
remarkably prominent areas of conflict.19 According to Laura
Unger, then Acting Chair of the SEC, it became evident that the
line between research and investment banking had become
increasingly blurred.20 The SEC acknowledged that research
analysts are subject to myriad influences that affect the reliability
and value of their analysis and recommendations.21
1 Investment Banking Relationships
A sell-side analyst's firm can significantly benefit from
"providing investment banking services, such as underwriting an
IPO, or advising on a merger or acquisition."22 All firms
examined by the SEC stated that analysts provided substantial
assistance to investment banking, such as consulting on corporate
finance deals, participating in road shows23 and advising in
possible mergers and acquisitions.24 "Moreover, it was
established by the investigations that analysts often provided
advance notice of their changes in recommendations and even
issued 'booster-shot' research reports right around the time a lock
19. Id. (delineating major areas of conflict, for example analysts'
"recommended the purchase of securities to the investing public and to
customers of their own firms without disclosing the fact that they owned those
very securities." Additionally, their compensation was "tied to their
recommendations," ... and perhaps most importantly, their firms "received
compensation -typically in the form of investment banking business- from
the issuer.").
20. See Unger Testimony, supra note 17; see also Gross, supra note 10 at 632.
21. See id. (explaining that there is a "mood of skepticism about analysts'
stock recommendations" which is in large part due to the now apparent
conflicts of interest analysts face).
22. NASD Guide, supra note 5.
23. Downes and Goodman define "road show" as:
[Plresentation by an issuer of securities to potential buyers about the merits of
the issue. Management of the company issuing stocks or bonds doing a road
show travel around the country presenting financial information and an
outlook for the company and answering the questions of analysts, fund
managers, and other potential investors.
DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 3 at 493.
24. See Unger Testimony, supra note 17.
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up period expired."25 One could argue that an analyst might be
more conscientious in his research precisely because his firm did
the underwriting.26 However, given the fierce competition in the
banking industry, analysts often feel pressure to issue a positive
recommendation in their reports, as not to endanger current or
prospective clients for their investment banking colleagues.27
For the buy-side analyst, the conflicts are no different. An
institutional money manager with a substantial holding in a
security does not wish to see an analyst put out a sell
recommendation on that security that may lead to a decline in its
price. 28 As a result, there has been "a proliferation of euphemistic
ratings- such as 'Hold,' 'Retain' and 'Market Perform' - which
small investors take at face value but which professional and
institutional investors know are often tantamount to 'sell.'"29
What's more, the ratings scales from firm to firm may vary
making it even more difficult for the average investor to
comparison shop and make an informed decision.
25. Gross, supra note 10, at 641. In her Comment Letter to the SEC,
Christine Bruenn, President, North American Securities Administration
Association, noted:
[F]irms often issued favorable reports on a company for which it had
performed investment-banking services, just prior to or after, the lock-up
period for the IPO ended. Insiders of the issuer generally are prohibited from
selling shares of stock they own in a company until a certain date has passed
(the 'lock-up period'), after which they may sell their shares on the secondary
market .... The favorable report would cause the issuer's stock to rise and
allow the insiders to sell stock at a premium.
Comment Letter from Christine Bruenn to Jonathan Katz, Secretary, the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, Relating to Research Analyst Conflicts of
Interest (Amendments) Release No. 34-47110; File nos. SR-NASD-2002-154; SR-
NYSE-2002-49, Mar. 10, 2003 [hereinafter NASAA Comment Letter].
26. See NASD Guide, supra note 5 (arguing that an analyst may be "more
knowledgeable or diligent in his research because his firm did the
underwriting," as opposed to feeling pressure not to "say or write things that
could jeopardize existing or potential relationships for their investment banking
colleagues.").
27. See id. (claiming that analysts are paid "at least partly and indirectly on
the basis of their firms' underwriting profits"); see also Unger Testimony, supra
note 17 (corroborating that many firms "pay their analysts largely based upon
the profitability of their investment banking unit.").
28. See id.
29. Id.
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2. Compensation
Further complicating this dynamic between investment
banker and analyst is the fact that "many analysts are paid at
least partly and indirectly on the basis of their firms'
underwriting profits."30 In fact at some firms, investment bankers
are directly responsible for reviewing the firm's research analysts
to determine their compensation.31 In such instances, analysts
will be averse to issuing a report that could jeopardize the firm's
profits and in turn their own compensation. In addition, an
analyst's report can also indirectly assist the firm in generating
commissions by provoking more buying and selling of covered
securities. 32 Given that a significant portion of a firm's income is
contingent upon the success of its investment banking
department, an analyst will undoubtedly feel pressure to issue
reports that will keep those revenues coming in.33
3. Ownership Interest
Finally, the analyst, other employees, and the firm itself, may
own substantial interests in the companies or market sectors in
which the analyst conducts his research.34 "An analyst may
participate in employee stock purchase pools that invest in
companies they cover or they may own stock directly."35
Additionally, in a practice called "venture investing," firms and
analysts may obtain a stake in a start-up company by acquiring
discounted, pre-IPO shares.36 According to the SEC's study, "if
30. Id.
31. See Unger Testimony, supra note 17 (stating that many firms "pay their
analysts largely based upon the profitability of their investment banking
unit.").
32. See NASD Guide, supra note 5 (explaining how an analyst's report can
generate money for the firm indirectly, through brokerage commissions).
33. Id. (stating that analysts will most likely be reluctant to make
recommendations that could threaten future investment banking profits, and
hence their own compensation as well).
34. See id.
35. Unger Testimony, supra note 17.
36. Id.
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the company went public and the analyst's firm underwrote the
IPO, the analyst almost always issued positive research on the
company."37 Issuing a positive research report can set higher
trading volumes that would not only increase the value of the
shares themselves, but would also result in higher commissions
for the firm itself.3m
C. Early Rules Designed To Regulate Analyst Conflicts of Interest
Previously, there were no broad sweeping regulations that
barred analysts from owning stock in companies they covered,
although some firms did attempt to put policies in place.39 Often
the analyst was simply prohibited from executing a personal
trade for a company he covered that was "contrary to the
analyst's outstanding recommendation. " 40 However, that policy
was usually too difficult to monitor; in fact, nearly all firms
examined "did not know whether their research analysts owned
stock in companies they underwrote and upon which their
analysts then issued research reports."41 Furthermore, disclosure
of analyst and firm ownership in recommended securities often
varied in both written reports or during public appearances in the
media.42 Some firms expressly stated that they or their employees
held positions in recommended companies. 43 Other firms merely
used boilerplate language stating that "the firm or employees may
have positions in the recommended issuer"44-not to mention
that many analysts who frequently hyped certain securities on
television or on the radio hardly ever revealed any conflict of
interest.45
For many years regulators have attempted to control and
monitor the relationship between analysts and the financial
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. See id.
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institutions they provide research for, by implementing rules and
mandating disclosures. For example, the Investment Advisers
Act of 194046 precludes those who provide investment advice to
customers including advisers and buy side analysts, from
engaging in "any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective
cient."47 Specifically under section 206, a failure to disclose to a
client or prospective client "a financial condition of the adviser
that is reasonably likely to impair the ability of the adviser to
meet contractual commitments to clients" shall constitute a
fraudulent act.48 Section 17(b) of the Securities Act of 193349 (the
"Securities Act") makes it unlawful for any person to receive
money or property as compensation for making an "untrue
statement of a material fact" or for omitting a material fact in
order to encourage a purchase or a sale of a security.5 0 Finally,
the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), a self-
regulatory organization ("SRO"),51 creates rules to regulate the
conduct of its members, which include nearly all securities firms
in the United States. "Because most sell-side research analysts
work for broker-dealers that must register with the NASD, they
46. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 18a (2003)
[hereinafter Investment Advisers Act].
47. Investment Advisers Act § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6. This section, entitled
"Prohibited Transactions by Investment Advisers," deals more specifically with
fraudulent activity through any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce. However, given the current ways in which securities transactions
occur, including the internet, this has a rather broad effect.
48. Id. at § 206(4).
49. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000) [hereinafter
Securities Act].
50. See Securities Act § 17(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b).
51. Downes and Goodman define "SRO" as:
[Plrincipal means contemplated by the federal securities laws for the
enforcement of fair, ethical, and efficient practices in the securities and
commodities futures industries. It is these organizations that are being
referred to when "industry rules" are mentioned, as distinguished from the
regulatory agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission or the
Federal Reserve Board.
DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 3, at 521.
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are deemed "associated persons"52 of their registered broker-
dealer firms and are thus covered by NASD rules of conduct."
NASD Rule 2210 states "no member shall, directly or indirectly,
publish, circulate or distribute any public communication that the
member knows or has reason to know contains any untrue
statement of a material fact or is otherwise false or misleading."53
Recent events have made it clear that such laws were insufficient
and that new regulations would be necessary to curtail conflict of
interest behavior.
II. KEY PLAYERS ON WALL STREET LOSE THEIR CELEBRITY STATUS AS
INVESTIGATIONS REVEAL WIDESPREAD CONFLICTS OF INTEREST - IN
RESPONSE SROs IMPOSE FINES AND NEW REGULATIONS
A. The Bigger They Are, The Harder Theyj Fall
Beginning in April 2000, it became gradually apparent that
manipulating analyst recommendations was not only extremely
profitable, but was also rampant on Wall Street and rapidly
threatening the integrity of the industry.4 Henry Blodget of
Merrill Lynch ("Merrill"), Jack Grubman of Salomon Smith
Barney ("Salomon") and Frank Quattrone of Credit Suisse First
Boston ("CSFB"), to name just a few of Wall Street's luminaries,
achieved star status by tipping stocks such as Amazon.com and
WorldCom.55 However, when the tech bubble burst and stock
52. Section 3(a)(18) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines
"associated persons" as among other things "any person directly or indirectly
controlling, controlled by, or under common control with such broker or dealer,
or any employee of such broker or dealer." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(18) (2000).
53. NASD Conduct Rule § 2210(d)(2). In general, the NASD rules dealing
with communications with the public state, "all member communications with
the public shall be based on principles of fair dealing and good faith and should
provide a sound basis for evaluating the facts in regard to any particular
security." Id. at § 2210(d)(1).
54. See Chinese Walls Need a Leak Test, supra note 2 (discussing the April 2000
"tech wreck and subsequent corporate scandals"... most notably Henry
Blodget, former celebrity tech stock analyst at Merrill Lynch).
55. See Patrick McGeehan, S.E.C. Seeks Information on Analysts' Supervision,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 3, 2003, at C1 (stating that "regulators singled out a couple of
2003] WALL ST. SCANDALS & RECENT REGULATIONS
prices began to plummet, all three found themselves at the center
of investigations for violating securities laws.
1. Merrill Lynch and Tech-Stock Analyst Henry Blodget Fall Under
Scrutiny When E-Mails Reveal "Piece of funk" Stock Received a
Favorable Rating
Henry Blodget, the high profile technology stock analyst, first
came under scrutiny in 2001 when a former client "claimed losses
of a half-million dollars from alleged misleading calls" made by
Blodget.56 The client contended "he bought about 4,600 shares of
the company [Infospace Inc.] and was persuaded by his Merrill
broker and Blodget's optimistic recommendation on the stock, to
keep the shares, despite their downward spiral."57 The client filed
for arbitration which Merrill later agreed to settle for $400,000.
The significance of this landmark case is that it shows when an
investor relies to his detriment upon an analyst who fails to
disclose a conflict of interest, the firm will be held accountable.-
Shortly thereafter, New York State Attorney General Elliot
Spitzer filed charges against Merrill Lynch. Spitzer alleged
"Merrill's recommendations were 'biased and distorted in an
attempt to secure and maintain lucrative contracts for investment
banking services' in what he described as 'a shocking betrayal of
trust by one of Wall Street's most trusted names."59 In recent
prominent former analysts in their findings, like Jack B. Grubman of Citigroup
and Henry Blodget of Merrill Lynch."); see also Gretchen Morgenson, Analyst
Coached WorldCom Chief on His Script, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2003, at Al
(discussing specifically the details surrounding the WorldCom scandal); see also
Meg Richards, Former CSFB Banker Faces Regulatory Charges over IPO Spinning,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 7, 2003 (describing how Frank Quattrone, former CSFB
technology banker was charged with spinning violations along with creating
and overseeing an organizational structure that undermined research analyst
objectivity).
56. Merrill Settles Complaint; No.1 Broker Pays Client $400,000 over
'Misleading' Call by Analyst Blodget, CNN MONEY, July 21, 2001, at
http://money.cnn.com/2001/07/20/investing/merrillblodget/ (last visited
Sept. 25, 2003).
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. See Chinese Walls Need a Leak Test, supra note 2.
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months, both Merrill and Blodget have been the target of
numerous class action and arbitration suits disputing that
Blodget's bullish research reports on Internet stocks, were an
inaccurate reflection of his own personal views.60 Substantiating
these claims were more than 30,000 internal emails, from a
number of employees, including Blodget, which privately
disparaged stocks calling them "a piece of junk" and a "piece of
s*t" that publicly got high ratings from the firm.61 Spitzer stated
the evidence illustrated how "analysts were heavily influenced by
Merrill's banking relationships with companies the firm
covered."62 Merrill eventually settled for $100 million dollars
without admitting any wrongdoing-a standard in an offer of
settlement.63 In April of 2003, Blodget was permanently barred
from the securities industry.64 In addition, Merrill stated it would
implement a number of new policies. First, it would separate
how analysts are paid from the investment banking business,
stating they "will be compensated for only those activities and
services intended to benefit Merrill Lynch's investor cients."65
Second, it would create a "Research Recommendation
Committee" to evaluate changes in stock ratings to ensure
impartiality. Finally, it would appoint a Spitzer-approved
"compliance monitor" to ensure the firm adhered to the
settlement.66 These policy amendments -along with an earlier
change by Merrill prohibiting its analysts from owning stock in
the companies they cover-were an attempt to allay concerns
about analyst objectivity. In addition, they foreshadowed aspects
60. See Landon Thomas, Jr., UBS Analyst Forced Out for Remark, N.Y. TIMES,
July 3, 2003, at C1.
61. See Chinese Walls Need a Leak Test, supra note 2.
62. Kim Kahn, Merrill Settles Charges: Brokerage Firm to Pay $100M, Doesn't
Admit Wrongdoing; Spitzer Sees It as a Model for Wall Street, CNN MONEY, May
21, 2002, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2002/05/21/news/companies/merrill/ (last visited
Sept. 25, 2003).
63. Id. ("[o]f the $100 million, $48 million will to go New York, while $52
million will go to all other states.").
64. See Thomas, supra note 60.
65. Kim Kahn, supra note 62.
66. See id.
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of future industry wide regulation, which will be discussed in
more detail in the next section.
2. Inspectors Focus on Analyst Jack Grubman When E-Mails Indicate
He Directed WorldCom Chief on What To Say Regarding Fourth
Quarter Financial Troubles
Jack Grubman, a former telecommunications analyst for
Salomon Smith Barney, earned more than twenty million dollars
in the years before resigning in August 2002, in the midst of stern
criticism over inadequately performing stock picks.67 Months
later, he settled with regulators for a $15 million fine and a
lifetime ban from the securities industry.68 In early January 2003,
a group of small investors filed for arbitration against Salomon
and Grubman, over Grubman's recommendations to invest in
WorldCom.69  Grubman "recommended investors purchase
WorldCom stock as it fell to less than $5 a share, from $60,
changing his rating to 'neutral' less than three months before the
telecommunications company filed for the largest bankruptcy in
U.S. history."70 As shares of WorldCom stock were falling, the
company's founder, Bernard J. Ebbers, held a conference call with
Wall Street analysts in an attempt to snuff out any rumors of
underlying financial crisis.71  According to e-mail messages
uncovered by regulators during their investigations, Ebbers relied
heavily on a script from Grubman advising him to put a positive
spin on things when discussing liquidity issues, off-balance sheet
matters and accounting problems. In reality, WorldCom was
rapidly approaching a meltdown.72
67. See Chris Burritt, Citigroup's Krawcheck Says Analysts Free from Banking,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar. 5, 2003; see also Morgenson, supra note 55.
68. See Morgenson, supra note 55.
69. See Salomon Arbitration Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2003, at C18
(describing complaints which claimed fraud and breach of contract as well as
violation of the Securities and Exchange Act).
70. See Burritt, supra note 67.
71. See Morgenson, supra note 55.
72. See id. (emphasizing the unusual level of collaboration between analyst
and executive. The emails reveal that Grubman was "anything but impartial
about WorldCom.").
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There is nothing illegal about an analyst advising a chief
executive how to approach a crucial conference call. But
providing such detailed coaching to an executive, as the ernail
message does, is highly unusual for an analyst and seems to
indicate that Mr. Grubman considered himself a close advisor
to Mr. Ebbers, playing a supporting role to what would
normally be the task of a corporate insider or public relations
specialist. "It looks as if Jack was calling the shots;"... "the
tone of it is a complete reversal of what you would see, where
the C.E.O. tells the analyst how he conducts the business. The
analyst would never be in the position to have the superior
knowledge base, ostensibly.73
Although Grubman admitted to having an intimate
understanding of WorldCom, he claimed he received such
information by attending some of WorldCom's board meeting$.74
Yet despite his close affiliation, Grubman claimed he had no
knowledge of WorldCom's accounting difficulties and that his
positive view of the company was "based solely on public
financial statements prepared by the company's management."75
Immediately following the conference call Grubman put out a
bullish research report confirming his strong buy
recommendation.y6 Five months later WorldCom filed for
Bankruptcy. 77
As of March 2003, there were "nine suits pending against
Salomon alleging that Grubman overvalued technology and
telecommunications stocks such as Global Crossing Ltd.78 and
73. Id.
74. See id. (testifying before Congress in July 2002 Grubman maintained that
his work required him to "engage in a serious, active dialogue with the people
who make the decisions in order to put S.E.C. filings and audited financials
into context.").
75. Id.
76. See id. (quoting Grubman as saying "perhaps the most significant
outcome of WCOM's earnings release was its very clear denial of the
unfounded rumors surrounding its liquidity position, balance sheet and
accounting.").
77. See id.
78. David E. Rovella, Ohio to Lead Salomon, Global Crossing Analyst Lawsuit,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar. 12, 2003:
[Ljead plaintiffs in this case are two Ohio pension funds: Ohio Public
Employees Retirement System and State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio.
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Winstar Communications79  to win investment banking
business."80
3. NASD Files Charges Against Star Banker Frank Quattrone for
Distributing Shares of Lucrative IPOs to "Friends of Frank" Executives
in Return for Banking Business
When Frank Quattrone joined CSFB in 1998 to lead the
technology sector investment banking unit, he was already
considered a superstar.81 Quattrone played a leading role in the
business of underwriting new issues for technology companies.8 2
He "created what amounted to a firm-within-a-firm at CSFB,
bringing with him dozens of colleagues and associates and
fashioning an organizational structure under which research
analysts, investment bankers, and brokers all reported to him."8 3
The Ohio funds control two of the largest securities fraud suits against
Citigroup... they were previously appointed to lead the shareholder suit
against Global Crossing, which includes Citigroup as a defendant. The same
group should lead the suit against Salomon for hyping shares of the bankrupt
owner of fiber-optic networks.
Id.
79. See NASD News Release, Salomon Smith Barney Fined $5 Million for
Issuing Misleading Research Reports on Winstar: Charges Filed Against Jack Grubman
and Christine Gochuico, Sept. 23, 2002, available at
http://www.nasdr.com/news/pr2002/release 02_054.html (last visited Feb. 2,
2003):
Winstar was a broadband telecommunications service provider that filed for
bankruptcy last year. Salomon's research reports strongly recommended
Winstar as a 'Buy'-Salomon's top rating-with a 12-to-18 month target price
of $50 even at the stock plummeted from approximately $20 on Jan. 25, 2001,
to 14 cents on April of that year. In the settlement today Salomon agreed to
findings that it did not have a reasonable basis for that target price.
Id.
80. See Rovella, supra note 78.
81. See NASD News Release, Quattrone, supra note 6; see also Daniel
Dunaief, CSFB Sidelines Quattrone: Tech Banker Put on Paid Leave in Cover-up
Fallout, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 4, 2003, at 45 (calling Quattrone the "godfather of
Amazon and Netscape and the most powerful tech banker in the Internet
Frenzy.").
82. See id.
83. Id.
272 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. IX
FINANCIAL LAW
This structure was not only profitable for the firm,84 but was also
personally rewarding to Quattrone himself, who received
compensation of over $200 million between the years of 1998 and
the end of 2001.85 One way Quattrone sought to win and retain
investment banking business was by "spinning" IPO shares-that
is, giving hot IPOs such as Amazon.com and Netscape
Communications, to a select group of Silicon Valley corporate
executives (the so called "Friends of Frank") who were able to
influence their employers' choice of investment banks.86 The
shares were allocated to these individuals and then "flipped back
to CSFB in aftermarket trading," producing substantial profits.87
Additionally, investment banking business was obtained through
holding out to potential clients the idea of CSFB issuing a positive
report about them.88
Tech group research analysts actively participated in soliciting
investment banking business. "Pitch-books" used in
presentations to prospective clients included excerpts from
favorable research reports prepared by Tech Group analysts
for other CSFB client companies. Quattrone created a
powerful incentive for analysts to initiate and maintain
positive coverage on investment banking clients by linking
their compensation to investment banking revenue and
encouraging investment bankers to participate in analysts'
performance evaluations. He also allowed issuers to review
and comment on draft research reports, including proposed
recommendations and price targets. 89
After standing behind Quattrone for nearly two years-
despite a $100 million settlement with the SEC and NASD
84. See id. ("[I]n 1999, CSFB managed more U.S. IPOs than any other firm.
In 2000, investment banking was the firm's second largest revenue source,
generating $3.68 billion dollars, a 60 percent increase over the year before.").
85. See id.
86. See Richards, supra note 55.
87. See NASD News Release, Quattrone, supra note 6 ("[Tihe NASD
considers this to be tantamount to cash gifts - a violation of the agency's
rules.").
88. See id.
89. Id.
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regarding the spinning allegations - CSFB finally backed away.90
Quattrone was put on administrative leave in February 2003 and
resigned in early March when NASD charged him for spinning
violations in addition to supervising an "organizational structure
that undermined research analyst objectivity."91 In a separate
complaint, Quattrone was later charged with "failing to cooperate
in an NASD investigation into whether he encouraged CSFB Tech
Group employees to destroy documents after he was notified of
NASD and federal investigations."92 Evidence shows he sent an
e-mail to his Tech Group employees encouraging them to
"cleanse their files." 93
Some say the "unraveling of the CSFB investment banker is a
big step in the market's healing process... because he's bigger
than Blodget, and he's bigger than Grubman. Symbolically, he's
the big fish, as big to this era's story as Michael Milken was to
his."94
B. Legislators, Regulators and SROs Band Together To Eliminate
Research Analyst Conflict of Interest
These recent events have revealed a significant hole in the
SROs' armor and have raised questions about the effectiveness of
SRO regulation.95 It is only in the last few years that regulators
have publicly acknowledged the "systematic problems in their
rules that created the potential for corporate scandal and
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Adam Lashinsky, So Long, Frank Quattrone, FORTUNE, Feb. 5, 2003,
available at
http://www.fortune.com/fortune/bottonline/0,15704,419947,00.html (last
visited Sept. 19, 2003).
95. See Ari Weinberg, Rewriting Wall Street's Rulemakers, FORBES, Oct. 16,
2002 available at http:/ /www.forbes.com/2002/10/16/lO16sro-print.htnl (last
visited Sept.26, 2003) (recalling how Elliot Spitzer in a late September 2002
speech "blew the cover off rarely discussed but supposedly wide-reaching Wall
Street practices. He demonstrated that SROs were disadvantaged by their close
ties to the securities industry and public companies, which were supposed to be
their rule-making and enforcement strengths.").
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conflicting business interests."96 In response, federal regulation
was established with the advent of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.97
Additionally, Spitzer, along with the NASD, the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") as well as other state regulators, have teamed up to
tighten the regulatory gap, restore investor confidence, and
breathe new life into the capital markets. The question is, will
this new set of laws be enough to accomplish these goals? It is up
to the SROs to prove that they are in fact significant market forces
and not merely facade organizations. 98
1. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
In July 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOA") was signed into
law by President Bush.99 Among other things, SOA adds another
layer of federal regulation regarding research analysts by creating
a new section 15D of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.100 This
new section mandates that the SEC adopt, or direct the SROs to
adopt, rules "reasonably designed to address conflicts of interest
that are known or should have been known by the securities
analyst or broker or dealer."11 This, in relevant part, includes
those issues that can arise when "securities analysts recommend
equity securities in research reports and public appearances."102
Section 15D additionally delineates specific areas which must be
addressed by regulators, such as disclosures relating to an
analyst's holdings in a subject company,103 and restrictions on
prepublication authorization of research reports by investment
96. Id.
97. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.L.No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be
codified as scattered sections of 11,15,18,28, and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter SOA].
98. See Weinberg, supra note 95.
99. See SOA supra note 97.
100. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.), amended
by Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.L.No. 107-204, 116 Stat.745, supra note 97, at
§ 501(a) [hereinafter Amended 34 Act].
101. Id.
102. Brandon Becker et al., Will Multiple Regulators Spawn an Inconsistent
Framewoork/or Research Analyst Regulation?, WALL ST. LAW. (Sept. 2002), at 24.
103. See Amended 34 Act, supra note 100 at (b)(1)-(4).
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bankers. 104 Additionally there must be limitations on persons who
supervise and provide evaluations of analysts,105 as well as
prohibitions on retaliation against analysts by their employers for
issuing unfavorable reports.1 06 Finally, there must be defined
quiet periods during which firms that have or will participate in a
subject company's IPOs are banned from releasing a research
report.107
2. The Global Settlement: The Dawn of a New Day on Wall StreetO8
On December 20, 2002, then SEC Chairman Harvey L. Pitt,
along with Elliot Spitzer, Christine Bruenn, President of the North
American Securities Administrators Association ("NASAA"),
Robert Glauber, Chairman and CEO of NASD, Dick Grasso, then
NYSE Chairman, and state securities regulators, "announced an
historic settlement with the nation's top investment firms to
resolve issues of conflict of interest at brokerage firms."1°9 The
resolution is designed to "bring about balanced reform in the
industry and bolster confidence in the integrity of equity
research."110 The terms of the agreement include:
a. The Insulation of Research Analysts from Investment Banking
Pressure
Firms will be "required to sever the links between research
and investment banking, including analyst compensation for
equity research."' In addition, analysts will no longer be
permitted to accompany investment banking personnel on
104. See Amended 34 Act, supra note 100 at (a)(1)(A).
105. See Amended 34 Act, supra note 100 at (a)(1) (B).
106. See Amended 34 Act, supra note 100 at (a)(1)(c).
107. See Amended 34 Act, supra note 100 at (a)(2).
108. See SEC, NY Attorney General, NASD, NASAA, NYSE and State Regulators
Announce Historic Agreement to Reform Investment Practices, SEC Press Release,
Dec. 20, 2002, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-179.htm (last
visited Sept. 26, 2003) (citing Christine Bruenn, NASAA President).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id.
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pitches and road showsY' 2 This rule is designed to maintain
analyst objectivity so that recommendations are not swayed by
the firm's efforts to obtain investment banking fees.113
b. A Complete Ban on the Spinning of IPOs
Brokerage firms are prohibited from doling out lucrative IPO
shares to corporate executives who are in the position to greatly
manipulate investment banking decisions." 4
c. An Obligation to Furnish Independent Research
"For a five year period, each of the brokerage firms will be
required to contract with 'no less that three' independent
research companies that will provide research to the firm's
customers."115 In addition, an independent "monitor" for each
firm, with final authority to acquire research from independent
providers, will be chosen by regulators.116 This provision ensures
that investors have exposure to unbiased research and investment
advice.117
d. Disclosure of Analyst Recommendations
Each firm will make openly available its ratings and price
target forecasts.118 This will enable investors to compare the
accuracy and quality of the analysts' performance, as well as
promote informed investment decision making.11 9
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
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e. Settled Enforcement Actions Involving Significant Monetary
Sanctions
"Each of the firms will pay a fine, pay monies towards
investor restitution, and will be required to escrow funds that will
be used to pay for independent research."120 The agreement
reached "totals more than, $1.4 billion in penalties, restitution and
monies used for investor education."121 The settlement payments
for each firm are outlined in the chart below. In addition to the
$900 million in retrospective relief, the firms will also pay $450
million over five years for independent research and $85 million
for nationwide investor education.122
Retrospective Independent Investor
Relief Research Education
Name of Firm ($ millions) ($ millions) millions)
Bear Stearns & Co. LLC 50 25 5
Credit Suisse First Boston 150 50 0
Corp.
Deutsche Bank 50 25 5
Goldman Sachs 50 50 10
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. 50 25 5
Lehman Brothers, Inc. 50 25 5
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. 100* 75 25
Morgan Stanley 50 75 0
Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. 300 75 25
UBS Warburg LLC 50 25 5
Total 900 450 85
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. See id. (citing chart entitled "Settlement Payments").
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* Payment made in prior settlement of Research Analyst
conflicts. 123
3. Regulation AC: Analyst Certification
In partial response to SOA, the SEC proposed, and recently
approved, Regulation Analyst Certification 24 ("Reg AC") which
is intended to compliment other rules governing conflicts of
interest disclosure by research analysts, principally NASD Rule
2711 and NYSE Rule 472, discussed below.- 5 Reg AC "requires
research analysts to certify that research reports they issue
represent their actual views and to provide disclosures as to
whether they have received compensation for the opinions
expressed in those reports."126 If any portion of the analyst's
compensation is or will be directly or indirectly related to his
recommendations in the report, the analyst must specify "the
source, amount, and purpose of such compensation,"... and
further disclose that it may influence the recommendation in the
research report.127 Furthermore, broker-dealers are required to
keep records of all public appearances made by their analysts
"within 30 days after each calendar quarter" in which the
appearance was made.128
Reg AC also includes a number of defined terms, which
differ in a several respects from some of the SRO definitions. The
meaning of "research analyst," for example, covers "any natural
person" instead of just any "associated persons of a member."-9
123. Id.
124. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 47384 (Feb. 20, 2003), 68 FR 9482
(Feb. 27, 2003) [hereinafter Reg AC].
125. See Barbara M. Johnson et al., SEC Issues Proposed New Regulation AC-
Analyst Certification, Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault, LLP, Aug. 19, 2002, available at
http://www.tht.com/pubs/SearchMatchPub.asp?ArticlelD=833 (last visited
Sept. 26, 2003).
126. Statement by SEC Chairman Harvey L. Pitt: Proposal of Regulation AC,
July 24, 2002, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch578.htm (last
visited Feb. 13, 2003) (paraphrasing Reg. AC).
127. Reg AC at § IA(B)2.
128. Id. at § 1B.
129. Id. at § 11A 1.
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The broad scope of this definition "is warranted because Reg AC
imposes core standards of integrity that should pertain to all
research distributed by broker-dealers and covered persons."130
Similarly, the description of "research report" was expanded to
cover debt securities as well as equity securities. The notion is
that such extension will promote the overall integrity of research
reports and confidence in research analyst recommendation, by
also protecting debt investors.131 In contrast, the definition of
"covered person" has been tailored not to include any associated
person that does not have officers or employees in common with
the broker or dealer.132 The purpose is to "focus the rule on
research that appears to be most susceptible to pressures that
might compromise integrity," (i.e., to generate investment
banking business), rather than to apply Reg AC to individuals
who are significantly independent from the broker- dealer.133
4. NASD/NYSE Regulations
Over the past several months, NASD and the NYSE have
attempted to coordinate comprehensive new rules to regulate
research analyst conflict of interest issues. In May 2002, the Board
of Directors of NASD Regulation, (now NASD) approved Rule
2711, Research Analysts and Research Reports, and authorized its
filing with the SEC.'34 Concurrently, NYSE approved
amendments to Rule 472 Communications with the Public, and
Rule 351, Reporting Requirements.135 These amendments were
designed to "improve the objectivity of research and provide
investors with more useful and reliable information when making
130. Id. at § IIA(1).
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id. at § A(2).
134. See NASD Proposed Rule Regarding Research Analyst Conflicts of
Interest, File No. SR-NASD-2002-21 at 13 (Feb. 8, 2002) (last amended May 1,
2002) [hereinafter NASD Proposed Rule, File No. SR-NASD-2002-21].
135. NYSE Amendment No. 1 to SR-NYSE-2002-09 Relating to Amendments
to NYSE Rules 472 and 351, (April 29, 2002) [hereinafter NYSE Amendment
No.1 to SR-NYSE-2002-09].
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investment decisions."136 In October 2002, after subsequent
"examination and further discussions with the SEC staff, NASD
and the NYSE agreed that additional rules [as well as
amendments to existing rules] governing members' research
activities were necessary to protect investors." 137 Amendments to
NASD Rules 2711 and 1120 were proposed, along with the
addition of new Rule 1050.138 Simultaneously, the NYSE
proposed further amendments to its Rules 344, 345A, 351 and
472.139 Final amendments to both the NYSE and the NASD Rules
were proposed and adopted in July of 2003. Below is a brief
discussion of some of the key provisions.
a. The Parallel Provisions of NASD and NYSE Rules
i) Investment banking and research department relationships
Both NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 propose to
minimize the control that an investment banking department has
over its research department by monitoring the communication
between those two divisions through an authorized legal or
compliance official.140 Correspondence between analysts and
investment bankers prior to the publication of a research report is
only to ensure factual accuracy and to watch for conflicts of
interest.141 Similarly, to reduce conflicts between the member
136. NASD Proposed Rule, File No. SR-NASD-2002-21, supra note 134, at 13-
14.
137. NASD Proposed Amendments to Rules Governing Research Analyst
Conflicts of Interest, File No. SR-NASD-2002-154 at 10 (Oct. 25, 2002) (last
amended July 29, 2003) [hereinafter NASD Proposed Amendments, File No. SR-
NASD-2002-154].
138. Id.
139. See NYSE Amendments to Exchange Rules 344, 345A, 351, and 472, File
No. SR-NYSE-2002-49. (Oct.8, 2002) (last amended July,29, 2003) [hereinafter
NYSE Amendments File No.SR-NYSE-2002-49].
140. See NASD Rule 2711(b)(3)(A); see also NYSE Rule 472(b)(3)(i)-stating that
any communication concerning the content of a research report between
investment banking personnel and research personnel must be made through
an authorized legal and compliance official).
141. See NASD Rule 2711(b)(3); see also NYSE Rule 472(b)(3).
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firm and the subject company142 (an issuer may attempt to
influence the conclusions stated in a report), an analyst is only
permitted to submit certain sections of a report to the subject
company and only for the purpose of verifying that they are
factually accurate. 4 3 Any subsequent changes to that report must
be accompanied by written justification by the analyst and
reviewed by the compliance department.44
ii) Restrictions on trading securities by associated persons
There are also provisions to restrict analysts' personal trading
of securities. These rules are designed to "ensure that research
reports and recommendations are not influenced by the prospect
of personal enrichment and to ensure that analysts do not profit
from the issuance of a research report or change in a rating or
price target."145 An analyst is banned from receiving any pre-IPO
securities,146 and may not "purchase or sell any security... in a
manner inconsistent with the research analysts' most recent
recommendation." 147 Additionally, there are "black-out" periods,
during which no associated person may purchase or sell any
security by a subject company, for a period beginning 30 calendar
days before and ending 5 days after a research report is
published4 8
142. See NASD Rule 2711(a)(9) (defining subject company as "the company
whose equity securities are the subject of a research report or recommendation
in a public appearance.").
143. See id. 2711(c)(2); see also NYSE Rule 472(b)(4) (clarifying that "members
and member organizations may not, under any circumstances, provide the
subject company sections of research reports that include the research
summary, the research rating or the target price.").
144. See NASD Rule 2711(c)(2)(C); see also NYSE Rule 472(b)(4)(ii) (stating
additionally that any change must receive written authorization from the
compliance department. Also, all drafts and changes of reports provided to the
subject company must be retained for three years following its publication).
145. NASD Proposed Rule, File No. SR-NASD-2002-21, supra note 134, at 22.
146. See NASD Rule 2711(g)(1); see also NYSE Rule 472(e)(1) (clarifying that
this is if the issuer is primarily engaged in similar types of businesses as
companies which the research analyst typically covers).
147. NASD Rule 27 11(g)(3); see also NYSE Rule 472(e)(3).
148. See NASD Rule 2711(g)(2); see also NYSE Rule 472(e)(2).
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iii) The imposition of quiet periods
Quiet periods are intended to prevent a manager from
rewarding the subject company for its underwriting business by
"publishing favorable research after completion of the
offering." 149  A member firm is, therefore, prohibited from
publishing a research report, and an analyst is prohibited from
making a public appearance, regarding a subject company for
which the member acted as manager or co-manager for 40
calendar days following the date of the offering of an IPO or for
10 calendar days following a secondary offering.150 There are
exceptions to this rule for certain secondary offerings and for
major news and events.'5 '
iv) Disclosure required in research reports and public
appearances
A member is required to "disclose in research reports and a
research analyst must disclose in public appearances: if the
analyst (or a member of his household) has a financial interest in
the securities of the subject company."152 Under NASD Rule
2711(h) the analyst must disclose the nature and amount of those
financial interests,153 or other material conflicts of interest held by
the member, the analyst, or a member of the analyst's family.' 54
In addition, any compensation received within the past twelve
months based on the member's investment banking revenues, or
any expected compensation within the next three months, must
149. NASD Proposed Rule, File No. SR-NASD-2002-21, supra note 134, at 21.
150. See NASD Rule 2711(f)(1), (2); see also NYSE Rules 472(f)(1), (2), (5).
151. See NASD Amendment No. 3, to SR-NASD 2002-154 Proposed
Amendments to Rules Governing Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest at 7
(last amended July 29, 2003) available at http://www.nasdr.com/pdf-
text/rf02154_a03.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2003) [hereinafter NASD
Amendment No.3]; see also NYSE Rule 472 (f)(5).
152. NASD Rule 2711(h)(1)(A); see also NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)(iii)(b).
153. See NASD Rule 2711(h)(1)(A) (clarifying that a "financial interest can
include any option, right, warrant, future, long or short position in the subject
company's securities.").
154. See id.
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be prominently disclosed in the written report.55 Although a
number of comment letters expressed serious reservations with
regards to requiring disclosure of any compensation, both the
NYSE and NASD have the latitude under SOA to impose such
disclosure requirements as long as they are consistent with the
legislative language and intent of SOA.156 Consequently, in an
attempt to minimize some of the potential conflicts of interest
which might occur, especially where a member is unaware of any
receipt of compensation, both the NYSE and NASD have
incorporated the "reason to know" standard 5 7 and appropriate
information barriers.158
There is also a provision regarding the firm's rating system
designed to better enable investors to compare and assess
research. The rule will require firms to "define in its reports the
meaning of each rating used by the member in its rating system"
as well as provide historical price and ratings distribution data.159
"Firms must disclose the percentage of all the ratings they have
assigned to 'buy/hold/sell' categories and the percentage of
investment banking clients in each category."160
v) Supervisory procedures
NASD Rule 2711(i) and NYSE Rule 351(f) each deal with
managerial requirements. Each member firm must adopt and
implement "written supervisory procedures reasonably designed
to ensure that the member and its employees comply with [its]
155. See NASD Rule 2711(h)(2)(A)(ii)(b), (c); see also NYSE Rules
472(k)(1)(i)(a)(2), (3).
156. See NASD Amendment No.3, supra note 151 at 10.
157. See Amended 34 Act, supra note 100 at (a) (mandating "rules reasonably
designed to require [disclosure of] ... conflicts of interest that are known or
should have been known by the securities analyst or broker or dealer.").
158. See Amended 34 Act, supra note 100 at (b)(2) (discussing compensation
"received by the registered broker or dealer, or any affiliate thereof, including
the securities analyst... as is appropriate in the public interest and consistent
with the protection of investors.").
159. See NASD Rule 2711(h)(4), (5), (6).
160. Brandon Becker et al., Will Multiple Regulators Spawn an Inconsistent
Framework for Research Analyst Regulation?, WALL ST. LAW., Sept. 2002, Vol.6, at
24 (paraphrasing Rule 2711 (h)(4), (5)(B)).
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rules."161 The member's senior officer must demonstrate annually
to the Association and the Exchange respectively, that it has put
those procedures into practice.
vi) Ban on IPO pitches
NASD Rule 2711(c)(4) and NYSE Rule 472(b)(5) attempt to
prevent analysts from participating in "bake offs" - that is,
communications with the subject company intended to pitch the
member's investment banking services. With the exception of
performing "due diligence"162 on a subject company, an analyst is
prohibited from communicating with an issuer "prior to the time
the subject company enters into a letter of intent or other written
agreement with the member designating the member as an
underwriter" of an IPO.163 In addition both the NYSE and NASD
Rules extend this prohibition beyond IPOs to include "any
activity comprehended within the term investment banking
business."164 It is intended that this extension will not only
address and clarify issues brought forth in a number of comment
letters, but will also better align these rules with the comparable
prohibitions set forth in the Global Settlement.165
161. NASD Rule 2711(i); see also NYSE Rule 351(f).
162. BLACKS LAW DICrIONARY 468 (Bryant Garner, ed. 7th ed. 1999) (defining
due diligence as "a prospective buyer's or broker's investigation and analysis of
a target company, a piece of property, or a newly issued security.").
163. NASD Rule 2711(c)(4); see also NYSE Amendment No.3 Relating to
Amendments to Exchange Rules 344, 345A, 351, and 472 with Respect to
Research Analysts' Conflicts of Interest, File No. SR-NYSR-2002-49, at 6-7
(discussing Rule 472(b)(5), but notably excludes language referring to the letter
of intent or "investment banking mandate" in the final rule) (last amended July
29, 2003) available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/2002-49am3.pdf. (last visited
Aug. 14,2003) [hereinafter NYSE Amendment No.31.
164. See NYSE Amendment No.3, supra note 163 at 61 (delineating NYSE
Rule 472 (b)(5)); see also NASD Amendment No. 3, supra note 151 at 6
(discussing NASD Rule 2711 (c) (4)).
165. See NYSE Amendment No. 3, supra note 163 at 7 (discussing the
rationale behind the changes in the rule relating to research analysts
communications with the subject company).
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vii) Compensation
To further decrease the influence the investment banking
division has over the research department, "no member or
member organization may compensate for specific investment
banking services166 transactions."167
Analyst compensation will be further separated from
influence of the investment banking department by employing a
compensation committee that reports to the member's board of
directors (or senior executive member).168 An analyst's
compensation will be based, among other things, on his
performance, productivity and research quality, as well as the
correlation between his recommendations and stock's
performance.169 No consideration will be given to the analyst's
contribution to the investment banking business. 170
viii) Definition of research analyst: trading restrictions
Furthermore, both NASD and the NYSE have refined their
definitions of research analyst to include those individuals
"primarily responsible for the preparation of the substance of a
research report."'7' These additions have a direct bearing on the
166. See NASD Rule 2711(a)(2) (defining investment banking services as
including " without limitation, acting as an underwriter in an offering for the
issuer; acting as financial advisor in a merger or acquisition; providing venture
capital, equity lines of credit, PIPEs or similar investments; or serving as
placement agent for the issuer.").
167. See NYSE Rule 472(h)(1); see also NASD Rule 2711(d)(2) (clarifying that
this rule applies to those "research analysts who are primarily responsible for
the preparation and substance of a research report.").
168. See NYSE Rule 472(h)(2); see also NASD Rule 2711(d)(2) (stating that the
committee will not have members of the investment banking division).
169. See NASD Rule 2711 (d)(2)(A), (B), (C)); see also NYSE Rule 472(h)(2)(i),
(ii), (iii).
170. See NASD Rule 2711(d)(2); see also NYSE Rule 472(h)(2).
171. See NYSE Rule 344.10 (clarifying that the rule includes any member,
allied member, or employee), see also NASD Rule 2711(a)(5) (noting that the
definition also extends to "any person who reports directly or indirectly to such
a research analyst in connection with, preparation of the substance of a research
report.").
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provision concerning the restrictions on personal trading by
research analysts.172 Rather than applying the same trading
restrictions to supervisory personnel, NASD and NYSE Rules will
be amended to compel member or member organizations to
require prior approval (from the legal or compliance department)
before such persons can "effect trades in securities of companies
that are the subject of research reports, ratings or price target
changes, which by virtue of their relationships, they can
potentially influence or control."173
ix) Lock ups
Additionally, in order to further limit the symbiotic
relationship between analysts and subject companies, NYSE Rule
472 (f)(4) and NASD Rule 2711(f)(4) prohibit "booster shot"
research reports or public appearances "15 days prior to or after
the expiration, waiver or the termination of a lock up."174 This
would preclude brokerage firms from publishing favorable
research for the benefit of shareholders "whose lock up
agreement is no longer in effect by driving up the price of the
issuer's shares."175  This provision shall not apply to the
publication of research reports pursuant to SEC Rule 139176
regarding a subject company with "actively traded securities" 177
or to a public appearance concerning such subject company.
172. See NASD Rule 2711(g); see also NYSE Rule 472(e).
173. NYSE Amendment No. 3, supra note 163, at 15 (discussing NYSE Rule
472(e)(5)); see also NASD Amendment No. 3, supra note 151, at 3 (discussing
NASD Rule 2711(g)).
174. See NYSE Rule 472 (f)(4); see also NASD Rule 2711(f)(4).
175. NASD Proposed Amendments, File No.SR-NASD-2002-154 supra note
137, at 12.
176. 17 CFR §230.139 (2003).
177. See NASD Amendment No 3, supra note 151, at 8 (referring to the
definition of "actively traded securities" in Regulation M, 17 CFR 242.101
(c)(1)).
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x) Qualification of analysts: NASD rules 1050, 1120 and NYSE
rules 344, 345A
The general purpose of NASD Rule 1050, and NYSE Rule 344,
is to raise the standard of those individuals engaged in research78
by requiring them to pass an appropriate qualification
examination.179 NASD Rule 1120, like NYSE Rule 345A, relates to
continuing education and includes a provision requiring analysts
to undergo "training in ethics, and professional responsibility." 8 0
III. RESOLUTION
Despite all intents and purposes to restore investor
confidence and re-establish market integrity, it is likely that the
real impact of these recent laws will fall short of that goal- and
may even have some unintended negative consequences. Some
critics argue that the rules are so "vague and confusing that it
renders them largely ineffectual."'18 Several "consumer groups
and members of congress say the new rules are better than
nothing... but they are years overdue and fall short of what is
needed." 182 It is evident that the regulations themselves have
caused nearly as much controversy as the corporate scandals that
gave rise to them.
The global settlement has a number of positive aspects to it,
particularly the provisions set forth for retrospective relief and
investor education. Problems may arise, however, in a number of
178. See NASD Rule 2711(a)(5); see also NYSE Rule 344.10 (stating
respectively that for the purposes of both NASD Rule 1050 and NYSE Rule 344,
a research analyst shall mean an associated person "who is primarily
responsible for the preparation of the substance of a research report.").
179. See NASD Rule 1050.
180. See NASD Rule 1120(b)(2)(iv); see also NYSE Rule 345A.50.
181. Comment letter from Securities Industry Association Regarding
Proposed Rule Changes of NYSE and NASD Relating to Research Analyst
Conflicts of Interest, File Nos. SR-NYSE-2002-49, SR-NASD-2002-154, March 10,
2003 at 3, available at http://www.sia.com/2003 comment-letters/pdf/SEC3-
10-03_AnalystConflict.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2003) [hereinafter SIA Comment
Letter].
182. Kathleen Day, SEC Imposes New Rules on Analysts, WASH. POST, May 9,
2002, at E01.
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areas. First, the settlement requires the firms to purchase and
distribute independent research from at least three sources over
the next five years. The question is: how will those costs get re-
allocated? As a result of a reduction in their revenue, "firms will
probably scale back and not cover as many companies."183 Or
these expenses may just be passed onto the investor, increasing
the transaction costs. Second, although some members of the SEC
support a permanent regulation that would provide for
independent research even after the five-year plan is up,84 the
value of this independent research is questionable.
The reports Wall Street will distribute to investors will most
likely already have been read and acted upon by institutional
investors. Professional money managers who run pension,
mutual and hedge funds pay large fees to buy these reports
directly from the boutique firms that Wall Street is likely to
use as their sources for independent research. By the time
average investors get this really high quality research, the
content of the research will already be reflected in the market
price of the stocks covered. 185
Third, there are potential issues regarding the content and
amount of information that will be passed onto the investor. It is
likely that the rating systems could be more confusing than the
old ones -making it even harder to compare firms.186 Even the
volume of the information itself, complete with disclosures,
disclaimers, and explanatory material could simply overwhelm
and even discourage the average investor. An industry-wide,
uniform rating system could simplify matters, and make the data
somewhat more approachable.
183. Ben White, Analyst Reform: An Issue of Dividends, Industry Veterans Doubt
Investors Will Benefit, WASH. Posr, Jan. 2, 2003, at E01.
184. See, SEC's Campos Pushes Permanent Independent Research, in IN THE
NEWS, available at http://www.compliancereporter.com (last visited Feb. 27,
2003).
185. White, supra note 183 (citing Henry T.C. Hu Law, Professor at the
University of Texas at Austin).
186. See id. (stating "that before the latest round of reforms, most firms
issued simple "buy" and "sell" ratings relative to the overall universe of
publicly traded stocks. Now, most firms rate companies in relation to a
particular sector or industry.").
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Fourth, investment banking deals may still be able to
indirectly influence analyst compensation, because analysts can
still "improve the bottom line of the firm." 187 It will be difficult
for analysts not to release bullish reports to generate investment
banking deals... unless firms are prohibited from publishing
research altogether.188
Similarly, the NYSE and NASD rules regarding analyst
compensation, while appearing straightforward, upon
implementation will become quite challenging. Although
analysts may not be compensated for specific investment banking
work, they may still receive compensation based on their overall
contribution to the investment banking department. Analysts in
their primary function are, therefore, still expected to work hand-
in-hand with investment bankers. 189  Even though their
relationship will be monitored by special committee, and
punctuated by intermittent disclosures, it will still be difficult to
parse out those acts not directly related to investment banking. In
sum, it is likely that the line between "specific" and "general"
contribution to the investment bankers will become necessarily
blurred.190
Perhaps one of the more highly criticized rules is Reg AC.
According to SEC Commissioner Goldschmid, "it represents only
one more patch, and a patch of marginal value, on an analyst
system that many have come to recognize is badly broken."'91
Reg AC is considered by some to be just a political exercise,
established by regulators to pacify the masses, while its primary
function is to do what basic securities laws have done for many
years- prevent analysts from being dishonest.192 "There is little or
187. Id.
188. See id.
189. Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking
the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1075 (2003) [hereinafter Fisch &
Sale].
190. See Id.
191. Robert Schmidt et al., SEC Approves Rule Ordering Stock Analysts to
Certify Reports, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Feb. 6, 2003 (citing Harvey Goldschmid).
192. See Dan Jameson, SEC Comment to File No. S7-03-02; Mike Lilies, Jr. &
Karr Tuttle Campbell, SEC Comment to File No. S7-03-02, Sept. 26, 2002
(questioning why Rule 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not
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no, prophylactic effect to be expected by requiring an otherwise
untruthful analyst to 'certify' that he or she is telling the truth."193
Certainly since the adoption of Rule 10(b) and perhaps for a
longer period under a number of blue-sky laws,194 "it has been
unlawful, as a federal matter, to make such untrue statements.'1
It is, therefore, dubious that Reg AC will increase the likelihood
of truthfulness.
Also, on a practical level, it may be unreasonable, if not
impossible, to require analysts to disclose their compensation.
Research analysts, like many other employees, are often not privy
to how their compensation is derived. The language concerning
this disclosure is so broad that an analyst who receives
compensation, based to some extent on his work regarding a
particular company that is an investment banking client, would
be "justifiably concerned at having to certify that his or her
compensation is not 'related', either 'directly' or 'indirectly' to a
specific recommendation or view expressed by the analyst"196
Perhaps the intent of this provision is clear- regulators are
attempting to bar analysts from receiving direct payment as
compensation for a favorable review. However, that matter is
sufficiently dealt with in the new NYSE and NASD rules. For
example NASD Rule 2711(h)(2)(i) provides that a member must
disclose if "the research analyst principally responsible for
preparation of the report received compensation that is based
upon (among other factors) the member's investment banking
revenues."197
simply apply to all those who "intentionally mislead investors" with statements
for which they harbor secret reservations...."), Joseph Borg NASAA
President, SEC Comment to File No. S7-03-02, Sept. 23, 2002.
193. Borg, supra note 192.
194. See DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 3, at 52 (defining "Blue Sky Laws"
as a "law of a kind passed by various states to protect investors against
securities fraud.").
195. Borg, supra note 192; see also Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int'l
Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588, 595 (2000) (holding that an oral statement in
connection with a sale or purchase of a security made with a secret reservation,
can support an action under 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
196. Sullivan & Cromwell SEC Comment to File No. S7-03-02, Sept. 27, 2002.
197. NASD Rule 2711(h)(2)(i).
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Although there was a significant effort on the part of NASD
and the NYSE to coordinate their efforts in establishing a joint set
of regulations, there are still a number of issues which remain
unsettled. In addition to the compensation problems already
discussed, the rules restricting analysts from investing in the
companies they cover do not effectively serve their purpose and
may even give rise to other problems. Such restrictions may act
as a deterrent for analysts from covering certain companies.198
Analysts will want to avoid covering those securities they wish to
invest in for their own portfolios.199 In addition, analysts are still
able to trade in securities covered by their fellow employees, and
thereby benefit from each other's recommendation. 200
Furthermore, although analysts are prevented from
purchasing pre-IPO securities in the sectors for which they
provide coverage, there is no provision in place to prevent them
from acquiring venture securities endorsed by their employer or
by other analysts.201 Consequently, analysts can symbiotically
benefit from each other's positive ratings. In effect, the rule does
not curtail the basic conflict which exists when investment
bankers own shares in companies they take public.202
In the days prior to the completion of this Note, regulators
attempted to resolve the issue of analysts' public disclosures in
the media. Originally, the NYSE proposed that an analyst should
avoid further communication with a media outlet that had failed
to include in their reports conflicts of interest disclosures that the
analyst had made to them.23 Those who criticized the NYSE
proposal argued that investors' need to have access to all the
pertinent information concerning their investment decisions
should not trump the media's First Amendment right "to
determine, without governmental interference, what information
198. Discussion with Professor Jill E. Fisch, Fordham University School of
Law (Sept. 2, 2003).
199. Id.
200. See Fisch & Sale supra note 189 at 1075.
201. See id.
202. Id.
203. See SIA Comment Letter, supra note 181, at 18.
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to publish."204 Critics further argued that the NYSE proposal
should be clarified to ensure that print journalists may "in their
editorial discretion and without penalty to their publications or
imposing restrictions upon access to a research analyst, decline to
publish the conflict disclosures required by an analyst."205
In response, the NYSE adopted a rule that analysts must still
disclose any financial connections between their firm and an
issuer, but "it will be left to the discretion of the press to report
such disclosures."206 Analysts will still be required to file a report
to their firms, including details of what was discussed with the
press.207
There is, however, little assurance that the required
disclosures will be published by the media. Regulators are
unable to dictate to journalists what they should write. Also,
many journalists may simply choose not to publish disclosures
for lack of interest. As a result, the effectiveness of the required
disclosures may be undercut.208
204. Matthew Winkler, Editor-in-Chief of Bloomberg, Comment Letter to
SEC, Feb. 19, 2003 (citing Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 230 (1985) ("At some point,
a measure is no longer a regulation of a profession but a regulation of speech or
of the press; beyond that point, the statute must survive the level of scrutiny
demanded by the First Amendment.") and (citing Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barrons,
442 F. Supp. 1341, 1353 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)). ("The Securities laws.., were not
developed with the intention of... inhibit[ing] the exercise of freedom of the
press.") [hereinafter Bloomberg Comment Letter].
205. Id.; see also Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
[Tihe choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to
limitations on the size and content of the paper... constitute the exercise of
editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how
governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent
with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this
time.
Id. at 258.
206. John Labate, Exchange Bows to SEC Request to Examine Governance, FIN.
TiMES, Apr. 4, 2003.
207. Similarly, under the NASD rule, an analyst is not instructed to "boycott
further communications with a media outlet" if that outlet fails to broadcast the
specified disclosure information outlined in the rule. See SIA Comment Letter,
supra note 181, at 18.
208. Discussion with Jill E. Fisch, supra note 198.
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Finally, there is little doubt that comprehensive reform will
help the industry going forward, "but without stiff individual
punishments there will be limited incentives for the brokerages to
change their behavior.209 The recent charges filed by NASD
against Quattrone hopefully represents a new trend among SROs
to hold more and more individuals personally accountable-
instead of having matters settled by their firms.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of all the corporate scandals that have
monopolized the headlines over the past two years, investors
have become extremely jaded. The recent regulations regarding
analyst conflicts of interest, while they show a tremendous first
effort on the part of the SROs and state and federal regulators,
they fall short on a number of practical levels. Inconsistencies,
overly broad language, and unrealistic requirements deduct from
their overall effectiveness. Many of these rules will need to be
amended before their intended objectives are realized. The goal
of restoring market integrity and investor confidence will not be
met without clearly resolving the conflicts of interest faced by
research analysts.
209. Paul Lapides, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 20, 2002.
Notes & Observations
